As it turns out, Schiffer was scheduled for two talks while in St. Andrews. The second one, earlier today, brought up the eternal question - It is, isn't it? - that is, vagueness. After going after Williamson's knowledge = evidence yesterday, he moved on to another topic favoured
by the Oxford philosopher, but this time picked a local opponent. Crispin Wright has
tackled vagueness, as he often tackles philosophical issues, by introducing intuitionism. And even though, as Schiffer put it, the views of Wright and himself are close enough to make
the entire discussion into "a family affair", they sure didn't play softball when it came to the post mortem analysis of Schiffer's talk. I say post mortem, because evidently Schiffer faced some unexpected trouble with one of his claims, all due to PhD student Elia Zardini and Prof. Wright. Your humble blogger cannot reconstruct the entire discussion, but basically it concerned the following argument:
(1) Necessarily, if anyone knows P, then P is definitely true and not P is definitely false, and thus P is not borderline.
(2) Necessarily, if P is borderline, then so is not P.
(3) Therefore, necessarily, if P is borderline, then no one knows either P or not P.
[this is alpha in Schiffer's handout]
The discussion on how to understand the components of this argument, whether
intuitionistic or not, and the expression 'definitely true\false', went on for close to an
hour. However, seeing that the discussion was promptly ended when the room was
invaded by undergraduates eager to start their course, the discussion once again became
an internal matter for the family council.
For those interested in the details of Schiffer's talks, you can find his papers here: