The Philosophy Department in St. Andrews is known for its specialization in philosophy of logic. Not only does the faculty contain major contributors like Crispin Wright, Graham Priest, Stephen Read, Peter Clark and Stewart Shapiro, it is also the home of the Arché Research Centre. In fact, this reputation is exactly my reason for coming here.
No surprise, then, that it was a major disappointment to discover that the M.Litt course anno school year 2005-2006, did not contain a single course in philosophy of logic, logic or philosophy of mathematics. But why? Has the department gone soft? Shifted to the dark side? Is the Moral Philosophy Department winning the eternal struggle against the Department of Logic and Metaphysics? Fortunately, none of the above. With Prof. Wright on "permanent super leave", Read on leave next semester, Priest and Shapiro in their HQs (respectively Melbourne and Ohio) during Candlemas semester and Clark being Head of School, there was just no one around to labour in the salt mines.
Not all of us, however, bought this line of reasoning. Okey, so all the Old Schoolers are busy, but what about the rest of the faculty? Surely, there must be lecturers or postdocs available and interested? Some of the M.Litt students, myself included, have lobbied persistently during the last month, and finally we are seeing the results. Today we received a revised list of next semester's courses, this time including what we all were hoping for: Philosophy of Logic as told by Patrick Greenough.
Here is the course description:
Philosophy of Logic (PY5324)
This module covers foundational issues in the philosophy of logic. Key questions
include: 'Is there a correct logic for natural language?', 'Does indeterminacy
demand a revision of classical logic?', 'Is the world precise or vague?'
Bibliography of Key Texts:
Tim Williamson (1994): Vagueness, London: Routledge
Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (1994): Vagueness: A Reader, MIT Press.
Stephen Read (1995): Thinking About Logic, Oxford: OUP.
Terence Parsons (1999): Indeterminate Identity, Oxford: OUP.
Scott Soames (1999): Understanding Truth, Oxford: OUP.
Rosanna Keefe (2000): Theories of Vagueness, Cambridge: CUP.
Graham Priest (2001): An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: CUP.
Roy Sorensen (2001): Vagueness and Contradiction, Oxford: OUP.
JC Beall (ed.) (2003): Liars ands Heaps, Oxford: OUP.
Provisional Course Topics:
Lecture One: Supervaluation, Vagueness, and Incomplete Definitions.
Lecture Two: Epistemicism and Classical Logic.
Lecture Three: The Open Future and Relativism Concerning Truth.
Lecture Four: Truth-Maker Gaps, Vagueness, The Truth-Teller, and Incomplete
Definitions.
Lecture Five: Truth-Maker Gaps, the Open Future, and Incomplete Definitions.
Lecture Six: Indeterminate Identity and Vagueness in the World.
Lecture Seven: The Logic and Semantics of Higher-Order Vagueness.
Lecture Eight: Contextualism and Logic.
Lecture Nine: The Logic of Appearance.
Lecture Ten: Contextualism and Higher-Order Vagueness.
Lecture Eleven: There is No Logic of Natural Language: Nihilism.
So, let me briefly recapitulate in case this story seems a bit unbelievable. 1) We asked for something and 2) we got it. In other words, the system is flawed. Long live the system!