Yesterday I had the pleasure of presenting a paper -- The Semantic Role of Proof-Conditions -- to the Melbourne Logic Seminar. The weekly logic group is a joint gathering of the Melbourne area logicians, Melbourne uni, La Trobe, and Monash. Although the crowd is pretty scary, it turned out to be a lot of fun. [My paper argues that if you believe in a proof-condition to truth-condition account of inferentialism (along the lines of Ian Rumfitt 1997, Raatikainen 2008), then you don't want to be a Francesco Paoli style minimalist about the (inferentially given) semantic content of logical constants. More will follow on this later.]
We also got the opportunity to see fellow visitor David Ripley's excellent talk about weak (very, very weak) negations ("Weak Negations and Neighborhood Semantics). Dave explores some negations weaker than those presented in the Dunn kite. Unfortunately, I don't have the whole lattice as presented in Dave's talk, but here's the upper fragment of it.
Thanks to Greg and the rest for having us in the seminar!