Spandrels of Truth
I recently wrote about JC Beall's contribution to the 1st FLC Workshop (Foundations of Logical Consequence). Now, JC's new book 'Spandrels of Truth' (OUP) is out. I read (and enjoyed) an early manuscript, but I'm looking forward to seeing the finished version. JC offers a new (modest) dialetheist theory of truth. It will be interesting to juxtapose his paraconsistent (non-explosive) approach with Hartry Field's recent book on a paracomplete (non-LEM) approach. Especially since they both share an important assumption, deflationism, yet combine this with opposing views about the logic.
Description
Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which "is true" is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of "true" are limited. In Spandrels of Truth , Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
Posts
7 comments:
I'm still very much puzzled by the title (as I already indicated in my previous comment, regarding the workshop report). In what sense is he using the term 'spandrels'? As mere by-products or as structural features which nevertheless do not have a direct adaptive role? (The more precise use of the term in biology is the latter.) Any clues from the book itself? It seems to me that it makes a huge difference for the overall enterprise.
I'm pretty sure Jc isn't using the term in the biological sense: there's no analogue of the 'adaptive role' in the discussion as far as I know. In my little summary I characterised the view like this: he's saying that given minimalism about truth,
“then the inconsistencies like the liar paradox are side-effects of the ‘design’ decisions, just like spandrels in architecture, and are neither to be worried about nor gotten rid of: instead, they’re to be lived with.”
I think I'm being fair to the position there.
Hi Greg, thanks for the reply, that helps. Interestingly, I once wrote a paper called "A lesson from medieval logic: how I learned to stop worrying and love the paradoxes", which defended pretty much the same view. I'm glad to hear that I'm not alone then!
Greg's summary is spot on (and, in fact, better than the OUP description, I think).
Catarina: your paper sounds great. I wish I had known about it. What are the details? (If you wind up reading the book, I'd be delighted to get comments.)
Cheers very much.
Hi JC,
The paper was originally a presentation that I gave at a somewhat bizarre conference in 2007. There was talk of publishing the proceedings; I did send the paper in, but haven't heard anything since... Hadn't given it much thought actually, until today. In fact I re-read the paper just now, and maybe I should try to get it published somewhere, now that the topic has become fashionable thanks to your book :). I can send it to you, if you are interested, and I definitely hope to be able to get hold of your book soon!
Catarina: thanks. I'm gurgling under the weight of deadlines at the moment, but I'd very much appreciate getting your paper. Thanks.
Incidentally, there's a 20%-off discount sheet for my book. (You can access it via Greg's post on his site.) So, if you do get it, you can save money by using that form.
Cheers.
Post a Comment